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I. INTRODUCTION
What role can courts play in furthering Progressive social change?
For generations of both law school students and political liberals, courts
have been understood as powerful producers of Progressive social change.
Starting with the civil rights cases of the mid-twentieth century, and
spreading to the issues raised by women's groups, environmental groups,
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political reformers, gay rights supporters, and others, Progressive forces in
the United States have increasingly turned to courts to produce the
changes they seek. In many cases they have won. American courts
seemingly have become important producers of political and social change.
Cases such as Brown v. Board of Education,' Roe v. Wade,2 and Lawrence
v. Texas,3 to name just three, are heralded as having produced major
Progressive change. Interestingly, such litigation has often occurred when
the other branches of government have failed to act. This suggests that
courts can produce Progressive change even when the other branches of
government are inactive or opposed. In times of Conservative domination
of the elected branches of governments, litigation can seem very attractive
to Progressives. It holds out the possibility of protecting minorities and
defending liberty in the face of opposition from the democratically elected
branches. Progressives see activist courts, then, as playing an important
role in the American scheme. 4
As powerful as the belief in the Progressive potential of courts to help
the relatively disadvantaged may be, it is a historically odd idea.
Traditionally, courts in the U.S. have protected privilege. Throughout U.S.
history and until the second half of the twentieth century, Progressives, for
the most part, understood this and avoided litigation when possible. They
understood that judges, and the courts in which they served, were
dedicated to preserving the status quo and unequal distributions of power,
wealth, and privilege. They understood that Progressive social change
could only come from legislation and social movements. However, since
roughly the mid-twentieth century, particularly during the Warren and
Burger Courts, this was forgotten. Progressives increasingly turned to
litigation and pointed to great victories in cases such as Brown as proof that
the role of the courts in the U.S. political system had changed. They were
wrong.
This brief Article expands on these two main points. First, it reviews
the Court's historical record as a defender of privilege in the areas of civil
rights, civil liberties and dissident speech, and economic rights. Second, it
argues that the great legal victories to which Progressives point as proof of
the efficacy of litigation did not, for the most part, produce the change they
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. This belief is developed in more detail in GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991), particularly in
the introductory chapter.
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wanted. Further, such litigation mobilized opponents, creating additional
obstacles for change. Forgetting the lessons of history, the Progressive
agenda was hijacked by a group of elite, well-educated, and comparatively
wealthy lawyers who uncritically believed that rights trump politics and
that successfully arguing before judges is equivalent to building and
sustaining political movements. This Article concludes that Progressives
have failed to understand the limits of litigation when they have won and
have forgotten the historic role of the judiciary as a defender of status quo
and unequal distributions of power, wealth, and privilege. The political
left's flirtation with litigation is fundamentally flawed.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORIC MISSION TO PRESERVE THE
STATUS QUO AND UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER,
WEALTH, AND PRIVILEGE
The following pages briefly sketch the historic role of the Court as a
protector of privilege in the areas of civil rights, civil liberties and dissident
speech, and economic rights.5 While this Article paints with a broad brush,
these substantive areas of law, and the cases noted, are illustrative of the
conservative role the Court has played throughout U.S. history. The only
minority the Court has consistently protected throughout U.S. history is
wealthy white men.
A. Civil Rights
For most of U.S. history the Supreme Court has supported and
reinforced racial discrimination against non-whites. This is an unpleasant
fact that most citizens do not know and most lawyers ignore. While the
cases are legion, three stand out: Scott v. Sandford,6 the Civil Rights Cases,7
and Plessy v. Ferguson.8 They merit brief discussion.
The main issue in Dred Scott, in 1856, was the citizenship status of a
slave under federal law.9 Dred Scott, a slave, brought suit in federal court
arguing that because he had been in states and territories that prohibited
slavery, he was now free. 1° Sandford, the slave owner, denied that Dred
5. Obviously there are other areas that could have been selected as well,
including gender.
6. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
7. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 400.
10. Id.
2006]
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Scott could bring suit, arguing that as a slave he was not a citizen entitled to
call upon the jurisdiction of the federal courts." The Supreme Court
agreed.12 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney held
that African-Americans were not intended to be "citizens" in the
Constitution. 3 They were not "part of the people" and "had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect."'14 African-Americans, as a
matter of constitutional law, were simply "ordinary article[s] of
merchandise."15
The Court's decision, as horrific as it appears to modern sensibilities,
reflected both the prevailing racist beliefs and legal understandings of the
time. As Professor Graber has carefully shown, the decision was in accord
with "[v]irtually every state court that ruled on black citizenship," the views
of four U.S. Attorney Generals who had issued opinions on the question,
and "the leading northern treatise on jurisprudence, James Kent's
Commentaries on American Law.' ' 16 Politically, the decision was in accord
with the policies of "the dominant Jacksonian coalition '17 and "Republican
legislators in New York and Ohio who in the wake of Dred Scott did make
a show of support for black citizenship were almost immediately voted out
of office."' 8 As the women's right crusader Susan B. Anthony sadly
acknowledged, the decision was "but the reflection of the spirit and
practice of the American people, North as well as South."'19 The Court
simply reflected the racist understandings of the times.
The Dred Scott decision was overturned by the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.20 The three post-Civil War Amendments made
slavery unconstitutional, 2' prohibited the states from denying people "the
equal protection of the laws[J ' 22 and guaranteed the right of citizens to
11. Id.
12. Id. at 404-05.
13. Id. at 404, 454.
14. Id. at 407.
15. Id.
16. Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and
Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 281-82 (1997).
17. Id. at 283.
18. Id. at 284.
19. Id. at 285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958, 967-
68 (E. D. N.Y. 1968).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
22. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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vote regardless "of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 23 As
the Court noted in the Slaughter-House Cases,24 decided in 1872, only a few
years after the adoption of the three Civil War Amendments, they had "a
unity of purpose" -the protection of the newly freed slaves. 25 "[T]he one
pervading purpose found in them all," the Court wrote, is "the freedom of
the slave race. '26 They were dedicated to "the protection of life, liberty,
and property, without which freedom to the slave was no boon.
27
Although this language suggested that the dark days of
constitutionally-sanctioned racism were at an end, any such thoughts were
quickly put to rest in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. At issue was a
challenge to the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which, in Section 1, prohibited
race-based discrimination in public places such as hotels, restaurants, and
theaters.28 Despite the passage of the Civil War Amendments, and despite
the fact that seven of the Justices had been appointed by Presidents
Lincoln and Grant and only two members of the Court were Southerners,
the Court struck down the Act by a vote of 8-1.29 The Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment only applied to action by the State, not to the
private action of individual business owners.30  Because almost all
businesses in the U.S. were privately owned, the decision meant that the
federal government lacked the power to prohibit racial discrimination in
most aspects of people's lives. Only Justice Harlan dissented, writing that
the Court's opinion was based on "grounds entirely too narrow and
artificial" that sacrificed "the substance and spirit" of the Civil War
Amendments.3' Justice Harlan argued in essence that when businesses
serve the public they are amenable to public regulation.3
2
In gutting the Civil War Amendments, the Court's majority opinion
went out of its way to express annoyance with African-Americans for
seeking guarantees of nondiscrimination:
23. Id. amend. XV, § 1.
24. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
25. Id. at 67-68.
26. Id. at 71.
27. Id.
28. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883).
29. See id. at 26 (indicating that of the nine Justices on the Court, Justice
Harlan was the sole dissenter).
30. Id. at 23-26.
31. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 55-56.
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When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of
the laws... .33
Although the case was decided less than two decades after the
abolition of slavery, and a mere fifteen years after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court made it clear that the Constitution
preserved white privilege and condemned African-Americans to second-
class status. The constitutional support for racial discrimination was
further strengthened in Plessy v. Ferguson,34 decided in 1896. At issue in
Plessy was the constitutionality of a Louisiana law requiring railroads to
segregate passengers by race.35 Given the holding of the Civil Rights Cases
that the Fourteenth Amendment was concerned with state action, and the
open and ongoing creation of an apartheid system in Louisiana and other
Southern states, it should have been easy for the Court to hold the law
unconstitutional. The Court did find the case easy; it upheld the
constitutionality of the law by a vote of 7-1.16 The Court reasoned that
even though the case involved state action, there was an important
distinction between political and social equality.3 7  The Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held, was aimed at political equality, not social
equality, arguing that "it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality. 3 8 Then, in disingenuous language, the Court claimed
that laws requiring racial segregation "do not necessarily imply the
inferiority of either race to the other. '39  In what can only be seen as a
deeply dishonest denial of reality, the Court wrote:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is
not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.n°
33. Id. at 25.
34. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. Id. at 540.
36. Id. at 540, 552.
37. Id. at 544.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 551.
800 [Vol. 54
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Again, it was Justice Harlan who explicitly noted the Court's racism.
Arguing segregation laws were based on white beliefs in racial superiority,
he poignantly wrote: "The thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations ... will
not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done."'41 Once again,
the Court had supported white privilege.
While it is true that in the twentieth century the Court backed away
from giving constitutional commendation to racial discrimination, it did so
only with hesitation and often in cases which affected only small numbers
of people. For example, in a series of cases the Court struck down
segregation in graduate and professional schools.42 To this day, the Court
has never explicitly overruled Plessy v. Ferguson.43 It was not until 1954,
eighty-six years after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
the Court invalidated racial segregation in public schools with the Brown
decision. Yet, as discussed below, the decision was not implemented.
44
Further, the Court backed off its mandate in 1974 in Milliken v. Bradley
45
where it disallowed a desegregation remedy that included suburbs as well
as cities "even though there was extensive proof of official actions
producing segregation and no viable solution within largely nonwhite and
poor central city school systems." 46 Moreover, in a series of cases at the
end of the twentieth century, the Court found no constitutional limitations
on the re-creation of segregated schools as long as such segregation was not
explicitly required by state laws.47 As Orfield and Lee concluded, the U.S.
41. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S.
631, 632-33 (1948) (per curiam); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 340-
41 (1938).
43. The Court came close in Brown, rejecting any language in Plessy to the
contrary about the negative effects of segregation on African-American school
children. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
44. See discussion infra Part III.A.
45. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
46. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
HARVARD UNIV., RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
SEGREGATION 9 (2006), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/deseg/RacialTransformation.pdf.
47. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100-01 (1995) (holding that the
educational components of desegregation plans could be cancelled even if they had not
yet produced educational progress); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492-93 (1992)
(permitting school districts to dismantle desegregation plans even though integration
had not been achieved); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (establishing
the policy of terminating desegregation plans and returning to segregated
neighborhood schools after a period of years). For a collection of new research on
2006]
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is witnessing "[t]he resegregation of blacks... [which] appears to be clearly
related to the Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s permitting return to
segregated neighborhood schools. '48
B. Civil Liberties and Dissident Speech
Despite the majestic language of the First Amendment and the
existence of judicial review, historically, the Supreme Court has seldom
protected political dissent.49 Only in those rare instances when dissidents
were supported by large segments of the elite did the Court provide any
protection.50
From the founding of the United States in 1789 (and the adoption of
the Bill of Rights in 1791) until the later part of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court provided little protection to political dissidents.
Government at all levels repeatedly and consistently silenced speech
critical of their actions with the approval of the Court. U.S. history is full
of examples, such as: the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Civil War, the
repression associated with the First World War, the subsequent decades of
silencing of labor and left-wing activists, and the Cold War.51 In examining
the pre-World War I judicial history of political repression, David Rabban
noted that "[tihe overwhelming majority of prewar decisions in all
jurisdictions rejected free speech claims, often by ignoring their
resegregation, see SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? (John
Boger & Gary Orfield eds. 2005); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S
NIGHTMARE? (2004), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/
brown50.pdf.
48. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 46, at 4.
49. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Sorrow and the Pity: Kent State, Political
Dissent, and the Misguided Worship of the First Amendment, in THE BOUNDARIES OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 17, 21-22 (Thomas R.
Hensley ed., 2001).
50. Id. at 32-33.
51. There is literature that records this history. See, e.g., ROBERT JUSTIN
GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO 1976 (rev.
ed., Univ. of I11. Press 2001) (1978); PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE
ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); RUSSEL B. NYE, FETIERED
FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1963);
WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF
RADICALS 1903-1933 (1963); LEON WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1927); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten
Years, 90 YALE L. J. 514 (1981).
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existence. 5 2 His study found a "pervasive hostility"53 to political dissent
and a "tradition of judicial hostility to free speech"5 4 led by the Supreme
Court. Indeed he found that "[n]o court was more unsympathetic to
freedom of expression than the Supreme Court."55
Consider, for example, that the great free speech opinions of Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, in cases like Abrams v. United States, 6 Gitlow v.
New York,57 and Whitney v. California,8 were either concurrences or
dissents in which convictions for speech critical of the government were
upheld. As Rabban points out:
[These and similar decisions] during and immediately after World War
One were neither a temporary aberration from a libertarian tradition
nor the consequence of an initial encounter with the First Amendment.
The wartime and postwar decisions were depressingly similar to their
prewar antecedents. They continued an existing tradition of hostility
to free speech claims.. .. 59
The Court's lack of protection for critical speech continued during the
Cold War. In 1951, the Court upheld conspiracy convictions of the
national leadership of the American Communist Party in Dennis v. United
States.60 The evidence supporting their convictions was their teaching of
the classic works of Marxism6'- many of which are assigned readings at
colleges and universities across the country.62 Government indictments and
judicial convictions of lower-level officials continued into the early 1960s.63
The Cold War repression, to which the Supreme Court lent its
legitimacy, is all the more telling when compared to the treatment political
dissidents received in other democratic nations. The United Kingdom,
52. Rabban, supra note 51, at 523.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 589.
55. Id. at 523.
56. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
57. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
59. Rabban, supra note 51, at 558; see generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE
SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTrEN YEARS (1997).
60. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 497-98.
62. See id. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
2006]
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France, and Australia all dealt with issues of domestic subversion and
communism during the Cold War years. In comparison to the United
States, none of the three countries had a full-fledged First Amendment,
and neither the United Kingdom nor France had a tradition of judicial
review whereby courts could invalidate the acts of the other branches of
government. Further, both the United Kingdom and France were "weaker
militarily and economically" than the United States, and, in terms of
"proximity," both were closer to the Soviet Union.64 Yet, despite these
differences, all three countries did a substantially better job of protecting
political dissent than did the United States. Indeed, the U.S. treatment of
political dissent in the Cold War years stands out among western
democratic nations, being characterized by Dahl as a "deviant case" 65 and,
more bluntly by Shapiro, as "pathological. '" 66
In the 1960s and 1970s, while government at all levels took steps to
harass civil rights and antiwar activists, the Court became somewhat more
protective of political dissent. 67 However, the level of protection must not
be overstated. It was also the case that the federal government engaged in
massive surveillance of the lawful political actions of countless Americans,
and the Supreme Court upheld the program in 1972 in Laird v. Tatum. 68
Those who publicly dissented against the war in Vietnam, and even those
who did not-such as parents, relatives, and friends of protesters-ran the
risk of government surveillance and harassment. 69  One must also
remember that it was not until 1965 that the U.S. Supreme Court first
invalidated a congressional act on First Amendment free speech grounds.70
64. See Herbert H. Hyman, England and America: Climates of Tolerance and
Intolerance- 1962, in THE RADICAL RIGHT 227, 231 (Daniel Bell ed., 1963) (writing
about the United Kingdom, but his statements apply to France as well).
65. Robert A. Dahl, Epilogue to POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES 387,391 (Robert A. Dahl ed., 1966).
66. MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 109 (1966).
67. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 4 (examining social change in the
1960s and 1970s and both the courts' role and governmental reactions).
68. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); see generally Developments in the Law:
The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1972)
(discussing the extent of government surveillance).
69. See INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP.
No. 94-755, at 165-82 (1976) (discussing the overbroad scope of domestic intelligence
gathering by the federal government).
70. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (invalidating an act
requiring addressees to affirmatively notify post office of their desire to receive foreign
communist political propaganda).
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And, of course, historically, the First Amendment was entirely useless in
protecting the speech rights of African-Americans. 7'
Given the Court's historic support of governmental repression of
dissident speech, how did criticism of the Vietnam War flourish, and how
has muted criticism of the War in Iraq been protected? The answer is that
both elites and regular citizens were divided over both wars, increasing the
political costs of repression. When elite elected officials and media
organizations (such as The New York Times and the Washington Post) take
up the cause of political dissent it is likely to be better protected than when
such elite support is missing. In such situations there will be both fewer
governmental attempts at repression and less judicial support for them.
This suggests, however, that it is political support, not judicial action, which
protects political dissent.
Perhaps no case more powerfully and poignantly illustrates the
Court's unwillingness to protect even the most fundamental civil liberties
and civil rights as Korematsu v. United States.72 In this World War II era
case, the Court upheld the conviction of Mr. Korematsu for remaining in a
military control area in violation of an executive order requiring all persons
of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast be evacuated from the area.73 As
commentators have repeatedly pointed out, none of the 112,000-120,000
people subject to the order, including approximately 70,000 U.S. citizens,
were charged with a crime.74 No evidence was presented that they had
violated any laws and no hearings were held. Yet they were all shipped to
what were in essence prisoner-of-war camps, where they remained
throughout the war. It is hard to imagine a more blatant violation of civil
liberties. Indeed, in 1988 Congress agreed, enacting legislation giving all
living survivors of the camps a $20,000 payment.75 In addition, Congress
offered an apology: "For these fundamental violations of the basic civil
liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese ancestry,
the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation. ' 76
71. See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1856) (declining to
extend the privileges and immunities of citizens to African-Americans because "it
would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects").
72. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
73. Id. at 215-16.
74. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 2-3 (1982); PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR 297 (1983); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 496-97 (1945).
75. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4 (2000).
76. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2000).
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As with civil rights, this brief history shows that historically the Court
has supported repressive majorities against vulnerable minorities. Civil
liberties have only been protected when there was more than a minimum
of elite and popular support for them. Looking to the Court to protect
core freedoms has not worked historically. Elliott Richardson put the
point well, writing more than half a century ago:
The great battles for free expression will be won, if they are won, not
in courts but in committee rooms and protest-meetings, by editorials
and letters to Congress, and through the courage of citizens
everywhere. The proper function of courts is narrow. The rest is our
responsibility. 77
C. Economic Regulation
Throughout much of U.S. history the Court has been no friend of
working people. Until the Court's capitulation in 1937 to democratic
forces, it regularly and steadfastly sided with capital against labor,
employers against employees, and with the wealthy against everyone else.
In particular, at the end of the nineteenth century, it accepted the
conservative call to read the Constitution to limit the power of government.
This history is reasonably well-known. Consequently, this discussion is
very brief.
In an 1886 book, Christopher Tiedeman, a professor of law at the
University of Missouri, argued that the Constitution severely limited the
power of government to regulate the economy.78  In the Preface he
described the threat the wealthy faced, attacked democracy as tyranny, and
called upon the Court to protect conservative wealth and power:
Governmental interference is proclaimed and demanded everywhere
as a sufficient panacea for every social evil which threaten[s] the
prosperity of society. Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are
rampant throughout the civilized world. The State is called on to
protect the weak against the shrewdness of the stronger, to determine
what wages a workman shall receive for his labor, and how many hours
daily he shall labor....
77. Elliott L. Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts,
65 HARV. L. REv. 1, 54 (1951).
78. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF
POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES vi-vii (1886).
[Vol. 54
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Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great army of
discontents, and their apparent power, with the growth and
development of universal suffrage, to enforce their views of civil polity
upon the civilized world, the conservative classes stand in constant fear
of the advent of an absolutism more tyrannical and more unreasoning
than any before experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic
majority.
The principal object of the present work is ... to awaken the public
mind to a full appreciation of the power of constitutional limitations to
protect private rights against the radical experimentations of social
reformers . . .79
The Court accepted the invitation. Largely through a constricted
reading of the Commerce Clause, and an expansive reading of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which the Court had been
unwilling to do to protect African-Americans), the Court stymied
Progressive change for nearly half a century. For example, it invalidated
the federal income tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. in 1895.80
It prohibited Congress from outlawing child labor in two cases in 1918 and
1922.81 It denied that either Congress or the states had the power to
regulate working hours82 or provide for a minimum wage.83 It prohibited
Congress from requiring railroads to provide pensions84 and disallowed
both Congress and the states from outlawing "yellow dog" contracts
(contracts prohibiting union membership as a condition of employment). 85
It took the Great Depression and the threat of FDR's Court-packing plan,
backed by enormous Democratic majorities in Congress, to break the
Court's protection of wealth from governmental regulation.
In civil rights, civil liberties and dissident speech, and economic
regulation, the Court steadfastly protected privilege. Progressives
crusaded against it. In fairness, however, the Court was not consistently
79. Id. at vi-viii.
80. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).
81. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251,276 (1918).
82. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 315-17 (1936); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
83. Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-62 (1923).
84. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935).
85. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915); Adair v. United States., 208
U.S. 161,179 (1908).
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that much worse than the other branches. The point is that it was no
better, and as discussed in the next section, even when the Court became
less hostile to Progressive causes, its decisions were not fully
implemented-if implemented at all.
III. THE ILLUSION OF PROGRESS
An obvious response to the discussion of the historic role of the Court
as a protector of privilege is that history is not destiny. Merely because the
Court has acted in defense of privilege for most of its history does not
mean it is destined to always so act. Indeed, many people believe the role
of the Court fundamentally changed in the post-World War II era. The
Court, many claim, became a great defender of the relatively
disadvantaged.
While history may not determine the future, structural constraints
limit it. 86 That is, it is more likely than not that the Court will consistently,
over time, support conservative outcomes. This is the case for four main
reasons. First, the appointment process means that federal judges, and
particularly Supreme Court Justices, must be broadly acceptable.
Presidents are unlikely to nominate radical Progressives and the Senate is
even less likely to confirm such nominees. This is because Progressives
lack the political support that would make their appointments broadly
acceptable. Second, the Constitution is a conservative document. It
protects private control over the allocation and distribution of resources. It
does not provide for basic Progressive rights such as employment, health
care, decent housing, adequate levels of welfare, or clean air. Third, the
Court is constrained from pushing too far ahead of the positions of the
other branches because it needs their support to implement its decisions
and is susceptible to sanctions. Fourth, the Court lacks the power to
implement its decisions. Thus, even if it overcomes the first three
constraints and issues an opinion that furthers the Progressive agenda, that
decision is unlikely to be implemented. This point is illustrated with brief
discussion of three important cases.
86.
argument.
See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 9-41 for further development of this
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A. The Victory That Wasn't: Brown v. Board of Education 87
Brown v. Board of Education may be the most well-known and
widely celebrated case in Supreme Court history. 88 In declaring that racial
segregation of public schools was unconstitutional, the Court repudiated its
prior, pro-segregation approach to the Constitution. This was clearly for
the good but the question for Progressives is whether Brown made a
difference in ending race-based segregation in public schools in particular,
and racial discrimination more broadly. The answer is no.
On the most straight-forward level, public schools remained
segregated after Brown. A decade after Brown virtually nothing had
changed for African-American students living in the eleven states of the
former Confederacy that required race-based school segregation by law.
For example, in the 1963-1964 school year, barely one in one hundred
(1.2%) of these African-American children was educated in a non-
segregated school.89 That means that for nearly ninety-nine of every one
hundred African-American children in the South a decade after Brown, the
finding of a constitutional right changed nothing.90 Change did come to the
South, but that occurred only after the Congress acted-providing
monetary incentives for desegregation and threatening to cut off federal
funds if segregation was maintained. 91
More subtly, there is little or no evidence that supports the claims
that Brown gave civil rights salience, pressed political elites to act, pricked
the consciences of whites, legitimated the grievances of blacks, or inspired
the activists of the civil rights movement. What Brown did do was energize
civil rights opponents and channel resources away from building the civil
rights movement.92 In the wake of Brown, resistance to ending segregation
increased in all areas, not merely in education but also in voting,
transportation, and the use of public places. Brown "unleashed a wave of
87. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
88. For an extensive exploration of Brown's lack of efficacy, see ROSENBERG,
supra note 4, at 42-169.
89. Gerald Rosenberg, Substituting Symbol for Substance: What Did Brown
Really Accomplish?, PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITIcs 205,205, Apr. 2004, at 205.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 205-06.
92. Id. at 207.
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racism that reached hysterical proportions."93  By stiffening resistance to
civil rights and raising fears before the activist phase of the civil rights
movement was in place, Brown may actually have delayed the achievement
of civil rights.
Litigation may also have delayed the achievement of civil rights by
channeling resources toward litigation and away from political organizing.
Progressive reformers always have scarce resources. There was great
hostility over both fundraising and tactics between the NAACP and the
groups that led the activist wing of the civil rights movement. As Martin
Luther King, Jr. complained: "to accumulate resources for legal actions
imposes intolerable hardships on the already overburdened. '" 94
In sum, Brown's constitutional mandate that racial segregation in
public schools end confronted a culture opposed to that change. The
American judicial system, constrained by the need for both elite and
popular support, was unable to overcome this opposition.
B. The Decision That Didn't: Roe v. Wade 95
In many ways Roe fared better than Brown. That is, the number of
legal abortions increased in the years following Roe-though at a slower
rate-both numerically and percentage-wise, than in the years immediately
preceding the decision. But they did so unevenly, with abortion services
widely available in some states and virtually unobtainable in others. What
explains both the increase in the number of legal abortions and the uneven
availability of the constitutional right Roe proclaimed?
The number of legal abortions increased after Roe because there was
public support for legal access to abortion, and demand for the service. A
national abortion repeal movement was flourishing with widespread
support among relevant professional elites and rapidly growing public
support. By the eve of the Court's decisions, eighteen states had reformed
their restrictive abortion laws to some degree. Indeed, in 1972, the year
before the decision, there were nearly 600,000 legal abortions performed in
the U.S.96 To the extent that Roe increased women's access to legal
93. ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 21
(1987).
94. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 157 (1963).
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an extensive exploration of Roe's
mixed record of efficacy, see ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 175-201.
96. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 180 tbl.6.1.
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abortion it did so because a grass-roots political movement had won many
legislative victories and had dramatically influenced both elite and public
opinion.
On the other hand, Roe faced the same problem as Brown-the
existing institutions necessary to implement the decisions (hospitals in the
case of abortion) refused to do so. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of
both public and private, short-term, non-Catholic hospitals, have never
performed an abortion.97 Like public schools and desegregation, the
existing institutions ignored the law. Constitutional rights were protected
under law, but denied in practice. However, in Doe v. Bolton,98 the
companion case to Roe, the Court struck down Georgia's requirement that
all abortions be performed in accredited hospitals.99 This allowed market
forces to meet the demand for abortion services by opening abortion
clinics. Pro-choice activists, feminists, and doctors, who wanted to expand
their practices, were relatively free to respond to the demand. Clinics could
and did open to implement the decision.
The problem with market mechanisms is that they implement rights
unevenly. This is principally because they are dependent on local beliefs
and culture. In places where political leaders or large segments of the
population oppose abortion, it is less likely that such clinics will open.
Thus, the availability of abortion services varies widely across the country.
Considering that the Court has held that women have a fundamental
constitutional right to obtain abortions, the drawbacks to the market
mechanism as a way to implement constitutional rights are important. The
availability of a market mechanism can help implement Court decisions,
but cannot guarantee them.
In addition to only providing limited access to legal abortion, Roe,
like Brown, appears to have strengthened the losers in the case-the anti-
abortion forces-and weakened the winners. The fledgling anti-abortion
movement grew enormously after Roe and the pro-choice movement that
had been able to change laws in eighteen states collapsed. One of the
results of the collapse was the lack of pressure on local institutions to
provide abortion services. This history suggests that if Roe is overturned
there may be a massive mobilization of pro-choice forces. While at least
some states may prohibit abortion, these are likely to be states where,
under Roe, abortion services are virtually impossible to obtain.
97. Id. at 190.
98. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
99. Id. at 194.
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In sum, the finding of a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy
has not guaranteed access to abortion for women. It derailed the pro-
choice movement and energized its opponents. As the executive director
of a Missoula, Montana, abortion clinic destroyed by arson in 1993 put it:
"It does no good to have the [abortion] procedure be legal if women can't
get it."''°
C. The Opinion That Backfired: Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health1 01
Goodridge, perhaps more than any other modern case, highlights the
folly of Progressives turning to litigation in the face of legislative hostility.
In Goodridge, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
state could not deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 0 This decision
followed an earlier decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court that the state's
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages, absent a compelling justification,
violated the state constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws,103
and a decision of the Vermont Supreme Court that essentially forced the
Vermont legislature to enact civil unions. 1°4
The result of these judicial victories has been nothing short of
disastrous for the right to same-sex marriage. The people of Hawaii
effectively overturned their court's decision by constitutional amendment.
Then, in 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the so-called Defense of Marriage
Act denying all the federal benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.10 5
Many states followed suit, and as of the 2004 election, at least thirty-nine
states had adopted measures designed to prevent the recognition of same-
sex marriage. 106 Even worse, there was a movement to limit marriage to
heterosexual couples by amending both the federal and state constitutions.
While a federal amendment has yet to be passed by Congress, every
constitutional amendment presented to state voters has been approved-in
100. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Real World of Constitutional Rights: The
Supreme Court and the Implementation of the Abortion Decisions, in CONTEMPLATING
COURTS 390, 417 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (quotation and emphasis omitted).
101. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). For an
extensive exploration of the impact of the attempt to win the right to same-sex
marriage through litigation, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2d. ed.
forthcoming 2007).
102. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
103. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993).
104. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
106. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
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almost all cases by lopsided majorities. As 2004 came to a close, more than
one-third of all states, representing close to one-quarter of the American
population, had banned same-sex marriage by constitutional amendment.
With several constitutional amendments on ballots in 2006, and perhaps in
2008, more states are likely to join the list.
What happened? The answer is simple. Same-sex marriage
proponents had not built a successful movement that could persuade their
fellow citizens to support their cause and pressure political leaders to
change the law. Without such a movement behind them, winning these
court cases sparked an enormous backlash. They confused a judicial
pronouncement of rights with the attainment of those rights. The battle for
same-sex marriage would have been better served if they had never
brought litigation, or had lost their cases. Now, they must either convince
majorities in more than one-third of the states to remove the constitutional
prohibitions on same-sex marriage that have just been added or hope that
the U.S. Supreme Court will strike down prohibitions on same-sex
marriage as unconstitutional. This is a daunting task-one that ought not
to have been faced.
IV. WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? RETURNING TO PAST
UNDERSTANDINGS
The sad story of the turn to litigation by same-sex marriage
proponents illustrates the current Progressive failure to understand that
successful social change requires building social movements. From Brown
to Roe to Goodridge the Progressive agenda was hijacked by a group of
elite, well-educated and comparatively wealthy lawyers who uncritically
believed that rights trump politics and that successfully arguing before
judges is equivalent to building and sustaining political movements.
Litigation is an elite, class-based strategy for change. 107 It is premised on
the notion that it is easier to persuade similarly educated and wealthy
lawyers who happen to be judges of certain liberal principles than to
organize everyday citizens. That might be true but without broad citizen
support change will not occur.
Litigation substitutes symbols for substance. The collapse of the pro-
107. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted more than a century and a half ago,
lawyers are elitist by training. He wrote: "hidden at the bottom of a lawyer's soul one
finds some of the tastes and habits of an aristocracy.... [American lawyers] conceive a
great distaste for the behavior of the multitude and secretly scorn the government of
the people." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (J.P. Mayer &
Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1848).
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choice movement after Roe is a perfect illustration as it remains the case
that for many women abortion services are difficult to find. Similarly, the
growing re-segregation of the nation's public schools is occurring at a time
when Brown has achieved almost mythical, symbolic status. The danger of
celebrating a symbol is that it can lead to a sense of self-satisfaction and
insensitivity to actual practice. Seen in this light, Brown is "little more than
an ornament, or golden cupola, built upon the roof of a structure found
rotting and infested, assuring the gentlefolk who only pass by without
entering that all is well inside. '10 8 Celebrating legal symbols encourages us
to look to legal solutions for political and cultural problems. Without
political support, court decisions will not produce social change. To
valorize lawyers and courts encourages reformers to litigate for social
change. But if political support is lacking, the effect of this vision is to limit
change by deflecting claims for reform away from substantive political
battles, where success is possible, to harmless legal ones where it is not. In
this way, courts play a deeply conservative ideological function in defense
of the status quo. When social reformers succumb to the "lure of
litigation" they forget that deep-seated social conflicts cannot be resolved
through litigation.
Today, there is some hope that Progressives may be turning away
from litigation as a strategy for change. The cause, alas, is not a re-learning
of historical lessons and an understanding of the limitations on courts and
the need for political mobilization. Rather, it is a realization that the
current Supreme Court is unlikely to promote progressive principles. If
this were the only effect of a conservative Court it would be a good thing.
The problem, of course, is that even if courts are limited in their ability to
help Progressives, they have more room to do damage. Courts are not
symmetrically constrained from furthering both progressive and
conservative change. This is because typically Progressives are asking
courts to require change while Conservatives are supporting the status quo.
Further, it is easier to dismantle Progressive programs than to create them.
For example, with Justice Alito replacing Justice O'Connor, affirmative
action plans may be found to be unconstitutional. We are now in a position
where courts can be an obstacle to change.
None of this means that law is irrelevant or that courts can never
further the goals of the relatively disadvantaged. For the civil rights
108. Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of
Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1970). Tigar
wrote these words specifically about the Warren Court's criminal rights decisions but
they are more generally applicable.
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movement, for example, courts played an important role in keeping the sit-
in movement going, ending the Montgomery bus boycott by providing the
boycotters with leverage, furthering school desegregation by threatening to
cut off federal funds under Title VI, and upholding affirmative action
programs. But in each case courts were effective because a political
movement was supporting change. The analysis does mean that courts
acting alone, as in Brown or Goodridge, are structurally constrained from
furthering the goals of the relatively disadvantaged.
As Progressives look to the future, they must understand that
American courts are not all-powerful institutions. They were designed with
severe limitations and placed in a political system of divided powers. To
rely on litigation rather than political mobilization, as difficult as it may be,
misunderstands both the limits of courts and the lessons of history. It
substitutes symbols for substance and clouds our vision with a naive and
romantic belief in the triumph of rights over politics. And while romance
and even naivet6 have their charms, they are no substitute for substantive
change.
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PROFESSOR MARK KENDE (Moderator): At this point, I would
like to open it up to our fellow speakers for comments, questions, and
various thoughts.
PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: I just want to say to start, I do
not know how many of you have read Professor Rosenberg's book The
Hollow Hope, but it is really a seminal part of the discourse on the role of
courts; if you have not, you ought to. I think he really made a contribution
as far as changing the terms of the debate, particularly on the left.
Having said that, I do wonder some about the kind of images of social
change that Professor Rosenberg uses-it sounds from his account like
pro-choice, gay rights, or civil rights litigators are hopelessly naive and
expect that the courts are going to be the only place where they can fight
their battles.
I think these groups are much more sophisticated and see litigation as
only one strategy among several that could be pursued. I also wonder if
you might talk a little bit about litigation as part of a dynamic set of
interactions where there are courts, legislatures, and cultural strategies and
how you analyze the role of the courts in the context of these multiple
forces.
For example, you used the Roe v. Wade example to say, "Well, what
happened when pro-choice forces won that court victory is they sort of
went to sleep on the politics." I am not really sure that is true, number one.
Number two, suppose there was no Roe v. Wade. Justice Ginsburg has
made the argument that if the political process had just sort of produced
the change over time, and this seemed to be where things were heading,
that there would not be a pro-life movement. I personally doubt that. I
think it would have reached a point where it was obvious where things
were going, and people who felt very passionately about it on the other
HeinOnline  -- 54 Drake L. Rev. 817 2005-2006
Drake Law Review
side would have risen up.
Now, they would not have had the Court to beat up. It would not
have been a conversation about judicial activism, but I think-and we can
take the same thing-and I will talk about this in the same-sex marriage
context-there would be opposition to it.
So, there might be something equally caricatured about assuming that
these debates are really only about the institutional question of who does
what. So let me throw a bunch of stuff at you to comment on.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Thank you. These are
really useful comments. One of the responses I often hear from
progressive lawyers is just what Professor Schacter said, "Well, of course
we are more sophisticated. This is part of a multi-tiered strategy." And I
say, "Oh. Well, that's interesting. What have you been doing on the rest of
the strategy? What part of your budget goes to this?" And they respond:
"We are really not doing much now, but we are depending on other
people." So I do not believe it. I want to see the numbers and the
expenditures. I think this is a line we get from lawyers who realize that
there is at least some literature that suggests that courts cannot solve all
their problems, and they give lip service to it. I think this is an empirical
question worthy of investigation.
Are there going to be some groups who actually do have litigation as
part of a multi-faceted strategy? I am sure that there are. But my concern
is too many groups are not really serious about this commitment. Now, I
think abortion is a fascinating issue, and Professor Schacter brought up a
couple of things: One, there probably would have been a counter-
mobilization regardless of whether there was a Roe because that is the
nature of the issue and it is the substance that matters; not the institution
that produces it. And she also asks, "What if there was no decision-what
if the Court had punted with Roe?" Again, with these counterfactuals, we
don't know. But what was so interesting was that eighteen states had
reformed their laws prior to Roe. There was a national movement. It was
going state by state. Pro-choice proponents were fighting the issue
politically.
I recall the response of anti-abortion forces in New York, when the
[Vol. 54
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New York legislature legalized abortion in 1970; there was some backlash,
but it was not to the extent that we saw after Roe. My concern here-and I
was going to bring this up in the discussion over your paper, is that I do not
know if there is a difference between reactions to decisions by different
branches, but I suspect that there is. It is an empirical question, and here is
why: I think when the legislature decides something, it's an opinion
reached by elected officials who, in turn, have to go out and try to get
reelected. What this means is that a decision is more likely to represent the
majority opinion. When courts decide things, for better or worse, I think
that many Americans feel they are unaccountable. They feel helpless.
They feel there's little they can do. And that creates a sense of outrage.
Now, again, I think this is a great empirical question, and I am trying to
figure out how one could study it.
What if there was no Roe? Well, we may get to find out. As we are
talking we are probably one vote away, and there is an article by Jeff
Rosen that is coming out in the Atlantic Monthly on this very question. My
best guess is after a short period of uncertainty, the laws will look about
like how they look today. Will South Dakota ban abortion? Maybe.
There are only 800 abortions performed in that state at the moment. Many
women from South Dakota who seek abortions leave the state. I am not
sure much will change. But, we may get to find out.
PROFESSOR JOHN EASTMAN: I want to pick up on the abortion
point because I am from California, and we were at the lead of the
liberalization movement. But what most people forget is that pre-Roe,
California was starting to retrench a little bit. I do not see that as a
negative throwback; I see that as part of the political conversation-"We
reacted in a genuinely compassionate way to the stories of abortions in
Mexico or backrooms. We may have overreacted." We are forgetting that
there's a bit of a balancing act that needs to go on here. There are clearly
legitimate and maybe even compelling interests on both sides of this
equation, and we need to try and find some solution that takes into account
the concerns of both sides."
Now, it's a very interesting political debate that was occurring. Now,
you may end up with a majority-supported rule, or a deliberative rule that
is even broader than the majority on fundamental questions like this; and
even people that lost the political fight feel that they have had a say. This
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was going on until Roe, and then Roe shut that conversation off.
I will talk a little bit about it in my paper, but I think Planned
Parenthood v. Casey basically shows that the Court is not even going to
respond to the political opposition. That would question the legitimacy of
the Court, and it shows how intent the Court was on shutting that sort of
conversation off. So I think there's much to that argument.
The second point I want to ask is, you make the argument that the
courts are ineffective in bringing about social change, but I wonder if you
might be even stronger than that and argue that they actually have a
negative impact because the courts have taken on the role of final arbiter,
and the elective branches now somehow think that they have no obligation
whatsoever to pursue these matters. This becomes particularly clear in
First Amendment cases. The argument is "We do not need to worry about
whether our campaign finance law restricts First Amendment rights. The
Court will decide that. I can vote for it, even though I think it is probably
unconstitutional and even though the authors of the bill on the floor are
saying, 'Yeah. This is probably unconstitutional. We will let the Court sort
that out."' This approach really takes the other two branches out of play
altogether. And if the courts then take a pass, as I think they have done in
a number of the First Amendment cases, we are worse off than we were at
the beginning.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Thank you. I want to
encourage my other panelists to get involved, but let me respond in two
ways. A graduate student of mine finally did a project that I have been
trying to get a student to do for about a decade, which is to take a look at
newspaper coverage of abortion, starting in the mid-1960s through the
1990s. I had a theory that the way in which abortion was talked about
changed after Roe. My student looked at the New York Times and the
Wall Street Journal editorials, in particular, and what he found is that pre-
Roe, much of the focus is on women's health; but post-Roe, it is all about
rights. And so the discourse changed, and changed away from an area in
which I think it is easier for people to deliberate and reach some kind of
consensus to a debate where it is now much harder to do so. So I think this
study supports what you are saying.
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On your second point, there's an old argument credited to a Harvard
Law Professor by the name of Thayer, that when the Court gets involved in
a constitutional matter, it removes the issue from democratic deliberation.
It gives elected officials a free pass. They do not have to deal with it, and
they can be less responsible. I think that is an empirical question. I really
have not seen a good study on this issue. I think that it is at least plausible.
It sounds intuitively right to me, but the empiricalist in me wants to be very
careful here.
PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: Let me jump in on one point
that responds to both of the last comments. I think we have to be careful
not to adopt an overly romanticized picture of the legislative process where
we have this wonderful conversation and all interests are represented and
everybody feels they were treated fairly and had their say. You know,
much of what we know about contemporary politics does not support this
image-look at the rates of who is really engaged in politics. It is really a
game of organized groups. Now, on a few issues-like choice-there are
active people on both sides. But on lots of other issues, including some
issues that the courts take up, there either are not active groups across the
board or there is a tremendous skew in resources.
So we can go back to some of our basic ideas and worry a little bit
about how the political process operates. I saw a recent study by political
scientist Martin Gilens at Princeton about levels of democratic
responsiveness. He looked at a bunch of issues where a poor and more
affluent people agree and disagree. Where they disagree, it is
tremendously more likely that the legislative process will respond to the
more affluent. So much of what we know about the political process, I
think, should make us give pause about overvaluing what will come out of
it, what does come out of it, and the people's sense of its legitimacy. We
live in a time where there is tremendous cynicism about the political
process, which does not necessarily build up the court side, but we should
be realistic.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: That last point I think is
right. What are many litigators for progressive causes saying? They say,
"Look. There's no way we are going to convince the legislature today or in
the foreseeable future"-which is probably correct. "So, therefore, we have
to go to court." It's the "so, therefore" that makes no sense. It only makes
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sense if there is a good reason to believe (a) you can win, and (b) that
victory will translate into change. Without that, even if you're right that
the legislature will not produce what you want, you need to have another
strategy.
Now, sometimes that's very hard. What I want to say to same-sex
marriage proponents, unfortunately, is: "Litigation is not going to work for
you. You are unlikely to convince many state legislatures. You did in
California, but the governor did not help you there, so you have got to
think of other strategies." Now, people will respond and say, "Wait a
minute. My rights are at stake, and you're telling me I have to wait?" It is a
very hard thing to say. But I'm afraid that the reality and the structural
limitations on courts make that an accurate statement.
PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: If I can intervene. The way you
have structured this argument actually makes a lot of sense to me. I do not
necessarily agree with the conclusions you have reached, but I do agree
that one should focus on what the limitations on courts are-on the process
of the judicial branch and the powers of judicial branches-as this is
critically important. The vocabulary within which that process takes place,
when you shift from vocabulary of politics to vocabulary of rights is also
important. This then narrows the range of options that seem to be
available. But it is important also to remember that when you are talking
about the Constitution, you are talking mainly in the context of the federal
courts. Many state courts are quite responsive to the electorate. My state
court (Texas) is, for example, quite responsive to the electorate because
they have to get elected. And so the question of where politics come in
and how you use the language of rights essentially to mark out the
boundaries of politics, I think is really important and needs to be examined
so that progressive litigation does two things: One, it might produce a
change in a particular case, but it also can change the way in which people
talk about the politics of that issue.
I will take an example. Marian Edelman, who was my first boss, had
a very sensible approach to litigation. We would go down to Mississippi,
and we would litigate. During the day we would be in the courts, but at
night, until we could not do it anymore, we would be organizing in the
community. Her theory was that we were going to go back to Washington,
and we were going to leave the people of Jackson and other places with
whatever we did. And they better be ready to support and defend their
own victory.
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So in fact, it is complex. When you look at the reality of progressive
litigation and the role of the courts, it is actually a more complicated story
than just a naked belief in the capacity of the courts to produce change.
What's missing I think is the discussion or the explanation of the link that
explains the theory of change that you are talking about.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Right. I wish Mark
Tushnet would not have been delayed for many reasons. But one is, in his
paper he has a very interesting argument about what he calls "off-the-wall
constitutional claims." And he says what makes something off-the-wall is
not legal, but social and without a kind of social movement, you cannot
make those kinds of rights claims in a state court. So he would say it is
more complicated when you have that kind of social movement and change
in conceptions, then you can go to state court, and what was viewed as off-
the-wall at one point is now seen as more mainstream.
Now, Marian Wright Edelman is unique in many ways, and one of
them, I think, is the experience you have described. If you look at the
NAACP budgets, they were spending somewhere between twenty and fifty
times as much money on litigation as they were on other strategies.
PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: But you cannot look at the
NAACP's budget without looking at the budget and the organization of
SCLC, for example.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Yes, but the SCLC did
not believe in courts.
PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: But their lack of belief in courts
and belief in organization gave the Inc. Fund the freedom to pursue its
strategy in the courts. And so if you look at not just as what the Inc. Fund
was doing but, in fact, what the movement for black rights in the South was
doing, it's a more complicated picture.
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PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: I agree with this: You
have a number of groups that are working for the same goal, employing
different strategies, but they often do not cooperate. There is a lot of
hostility between...
PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: That is politics.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: No, here is the point: If
you're litigating, you cannot rely on the hope that there are going to be
other groups having other strategies. If that is your theory, you've got to
coordinate; otherwise you end up with the same-sex marriage situation,
which I think has been a disaster.
PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: Well, it may have been a
disaster, but it is not for lack of coordination. The human rights campaign,
LAMBDA, and all the major legal groups are by no means restricting
themselves to the courts. They are heavily involved in organizing in the
fifty states. And I do not think it is descriptively accurate -they may have
made a bad tactical decision and maybe the calculation to press forward
with litigation was wrong-I do not disagree with your bottom line-to say
they have not thought about the legislative side.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Perhaps. I remember
about ten years ago having a very heated discussion with Evan Wolfson,
one of the main litigators. And he went on and on about how litigation is a
last resort. We have to have a whole strategy, we have to invest most of
our resources, and he hasn't done any of that. All he's done is litigate with
disastrous results.
PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: Now, I do not think that's true,
either. He has actually spearheaded a movement. It may not be
particularly effective, but it is sort of about public education. The other
thing about same-sex marriage is that when the Hawaii case was brought in
the early 1990s, it was not brought by any of the organized gay rights
groups. The movement did not make a decision, "Now is the time for
same-sex marriage." An entrepreneurial lawyer brought a case that had
unexpected success in the Hawaii Supreme Court that just unleashed a set
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of events. Sometimes movements pushing for social change are not easily
controlled.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Right.
PROFESSOR JANE SCHACTER: So it actually can be understood
as maybe a debatable set of decisions about how to respond to it. But not
as a decision with just full force in the courts with a consequences be
damned mentality.
PROFESSOR GERALD TORRES: I think it is also important to
think carefully about how you define a victory as not every defeat in court
is in fact, a defeat; and conversely not every victory in court is a victory. It
is only from the context of politics that you can reframe or consider this
question. Let me give you an example: The unreported case of Delgado v.
Bastrop ISD. Under the Texas constitution they were supposed to equalize
school funding and not racially discriminate, and they had Mexican schools
in Texas. And so the kids-or the parents from Bastrop-argued that this
is a Mexican school, and it ought to be funded equally. Well, what the
court did is to say, "If that is true, if they are segregated on the basis of race
and the funding is unequal, then it ought to be changed." And the
response was, "Well, we never really thought Mexicans were a different
race, and so we changed the name from Bastrop Mexican School to the
Bastrop School." And since there is no obligation for us to respond to
class-based differences in funding, these are just the breaks-so it is a
defeat.
On the other hand, what it does is cause people to start thinking
about school funding as a class-based matter. So now you have race on one
hand and class on the other, and this caused people worried about funding
public education to think about different strategies. So it was a defeat, but
not really, because it did change the frame in which the politics of school
finance went forward-which we are still fighting over. In fact, we are
about to start a special session in Texas any minute now and continue this
fight.
2006] 825
HeinOnline  -- 54 Drake L. Rev. 825 2005-2006
Drake Law Review
PROFESSOR MARK KENDE (Moderator): If I could just ask you
a question as well. I am struck by the sort of zero-sum view you have of
resources. You sort of seem to have an argument that, "Well, if you do not
put the resources into litigation, you could put it into the legislature." As a
former civil rights lawyer, my experience was that a victory in litigation-
and you don't always win-generates funding, and there is an energizing
effect. In your book you discuss the catalyst effect, and you do some really
important empirical analysis. But you mentioned apartheid. Even in
South Africa, where I have friends who have litigated, they talk about the
energizing effect to their litigation effort in South Africa of the Brown
decision. And so when an organization like the LDF has an important
success, it generates funding. I do not have empirical evidence as to the
amounts, but it just seems commonsensical that when you do have some of
these victories, you are going to generate funding, and that funding can be
used not just for litigation but for legislation which means that it is not a
completely zero-sum game.
I suppose one argument on the other side is that Brown and the
actions of LDF energized the right so that now the right has groups like the
LDF. But the LDF formula for doing things had an influence regardless of
how one sees Brown. So I would be curious to know what you think about
that.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Yeah. It used to be that
my mailbox was full of requests for money saying, "Look. We just won this
great case. Look at what great work we are doing. Send us your checks."
The question becomes what other organizing tools are there? Often
groups litigate cases to raise money, but there are other ways of raising
money. For example, the NAACP at the time of Brown, started a major
fundraising campaign that was independent of Brown-just the timing
happened to work that way-and it brought in substantially more money
than past efforts. So to me, it is not merely the case-it is an organization's
choice to go out on a campaign to raise money, and it seems to me they can
choose other avenues to do so. Now, cases are useful because you can
more likely win here than in the legislature; so, yes, you can use it to raise
money, but you can also do other things. And my concern is the negative
costs that you raised. But I agree, and Professor Schacter often talks about
caution in using context, and I agree with that maxim, and I have been
ignoring it. A lot of the comments I think have been very useful in trying
to take my broad brush and make it a little finer. I do not disagree with the
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spirit, although I sometimes disagree with the examples.
PROFESSOR MARK KENDE (Moderator): Why don't we see if
there are some audience questions?
ED MANSFIELD (Audience): Professor Rosenberg, as I listen to
your review of history, it seemed to me you were kind of making two
different points. One is that there is sort of an inherent limitation in the
ability of the Court that makes them unable to successfully bring about
social change. But the other point you seem to be making is that there
have been some bad decisions over the years; and maybe if you had the
right people in the courts, you would get better decisions that would bring
about social change. Are there two different points you are making, or is
this just one?
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: I think that is a good
question. Sorry for the confusion. I think there are two different points,
but they come together. And you use the word "bad people." I would say
people not committed to a progressive agenda. My point is, I think
structurally you are unlikely to get courts full of people committed to a
progressive agenda. And if you do, you will not need the Court at that
point because you'll have a political system that is committed to that
agenda. But I think they're both important. Then the other strand, I was
attempting to point out that even when you win, there are many constraints
that make it unclear or uncertain whether that decision will be
implemented.
PROFESSOR RUSSELL LOVELL (Audience): Gerry, it seems to
me that you have made the point that progressive lawyers are naive to
think that the courts are always going to be a faction of social change. But
really, is not the larger point to be found not in terms of realizing that a
broad-based remedial strategy is always present, but that it also recognizes
the human dynamic? You did not talk about prison reform litigation. But
it seems to me that this was a perfect example of progress that almost never
would have happened in the legislative process. There just was no
constituency to mobilize that faction, and if Warren Burger who had
preceded the conservatives had opened the door to the federal courts and
litigation, reform would not have happened. Now, I recognize that there
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was backlash and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of '95 has kind of
halted that, but you have to look for these windows of opportunity. There
was about a twenty year window, and it did effectuate some really dramatic
changes.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Prison reform is a really
interesting area. I do, actually, write about it in the book and what I
suggest is that there are four conditions which, if any one is met, it then
makes sense for progressives to litigate. One of them is when the key
administrators or people who are required to implement the decision either
support the aims of the litigation or see it as a way of leveraging other
resources. So one of the things you find in a lot of the prison litigation is
that the named defendants are actually the plaintiffs. What these prison
administrators are trying to do is gain more resources to upgrade their
prisons and they do not think they can get them from the legislatures, so
they basically work hand in glove with the plaintiffs to see if they can lose
cases and then use that as leverage. Ed Rubin, the dean of Vanderbilt, and
Malcolm Feeley have a really interesting book that focuses just on prison
litigation.
The second point was that there were forces at the time very
concerned about prison conditions, and one of them was the organization
of prison administrators. Now, they were unable to get many resources
until the litigation, but their commitment made litigation a good idea. I do
not know. Does that respond at all? I think I am coming a long way
toward your position.
PROFESSOR RUSSELL LOVELL (Audience): I think your point
that oftentimes administrators or legislatures utilize or leverage federal
court decisions to shift the political heat to the courts is certainly a reality.
And I think that there are also times where defendants who maybe would
not have staked their political career on making the change or working for
it, but where it would not inhibit or resist the change. On the other hand,
there were certainly many schools or prisons that deeply resisted and
without the courts and their enforcement power.
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: Right. Well, on the other
hand, often in those cases change has been slow and has been much less
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than the courts have ordered. But I think we basically agree, actually.
PROFESSOR MARK KENDE (Moderator): I think we have time
for one more question.
DENNIS GOLDFORD: (Audience): Given that judges get on the
bench either because they themselves are elected or they are appointed or
confirmed by people who are elected, you can make the point, that if your
political movement needs the aid of the courts, you are probably not going
to find favorable courts in the first place. And if you are going to find
favorable courts, you did not really need them in the first place. But if that
is the case, are you basically saying goodbye to Justice Jackson's argument
that the very purpose of the Bill of Rights is to take certain matters out of
the electoral process. What is left for the courts to do, at least the federal
courts, other than decide separation of powers issues in federal cases?
PROFESSOR GERALD ROSENBERG: I think the response is an
empirical one, and I think that the Bill of Rights does not particularly
matter because the courts seldom defend it, and when they do, the
decisions are not implemented. One of the interesting things I do with my
law students is ask how many of them said prayers in their public school
classes, and it is usually about a third of the class. You know, the last time
I checked, that was unconstitutional, but it happens all over the place. So I
am a Bill of Rights skeptic.
DENNIS GOLDFORD (Audience): So in a sense, you come at the
same position from the left that many on the right come from?
PROFESSOR ROSENBERG: Yes, but for different reasons. Very
different reasons.
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